An approach based on multi-formalism modeling to model, analyze, and evaluate the effect of cyber exploits on the coordination in decision making organizations is presented. The focus is on the effect that cyber exploits have on information sharing and task synchronization. The organization members are supported by systems and interact with each other through communication networks. Colored Petri Nets are used to model the decision makers in the organization and computer network models to represent their interactions. Protocols of interaction are modeled by rules of enablement where the decision makers, when interacting, must refer to the same state of the environment. Two measures of performance are then introduced: information consistency and synchronization. The multiformalism based modeling approach and the computation of the measures of performance are illustrated though a simple example.
INTRODUCTION
Assessing the effect of cyber exploits on an organization's performance is a challenging problem. A cyber exploit is an action that affects the performance of an information system by taking advantage of its cyber vulnerabilities. The evaluation of the effectiveness of a decision making organization consisting of human decision makers supported by systems and interacting through networks is a complex issue: many interrelated factors affect the effectiveness of the overall system, e.g., the limited information processing capacities of the decision makers and the hardware and software characteristics of the systems. Consequently, models are needed of organizations performing well defined tasks and of their information systems, as well as performance evaluation measures and procedures for computing them. An integrated methodology that exploits multi-formalism modeling and is based on some earlier work has been developed and is described in this paper.
One of the key effects of cyber exploits is the degradation of the cohesiveness of organizations carrying out well-defined tasks in a coordinated manner. A mathematical description of coordination was developed for decision-making processes by Grevet and Levis (1988) . When confronted with a particular task, organization members need to access information from the supporting systems and to interact with each other following well defined processes. Such is the case in command centers such as Air Operations Centers, Air Traffic Control centers, etc. When decision makers interact, they must have some protocol to recognize that they are working on the same task and that they are sharing information that pertains to that task. Two measures for evaluating coordination were introduced: information consistency and synchronization. The latter measure relates to the value of information when the decision makers actually process it.
The approach taken in this work is that of modular, horizontal multi-formalism (Gribaudo and Iacono, 2014) . A generic Petri Net model of an interacting decision maker is used. (Levis, 1992) That model has been extended to include systems that support the decision makers and communication networks that enable their interaction. The decision making organization is modeled as a Colored Petri Net (Jensen and Kristensen, 2009) and is implemented in CPNTools (CPNTools, 2014) . The computer networks are modeled as queuing nets and implemented in OMNeT++ (OMNeT++, 2014) . These two models, each expressed in a different modeling language (formalism), interoperate through an infrastructure, the Command and Control Wind Tunnel. This is shown in Fig. 1 . (Hemingway et al., 2001) Figure 1: Multi-formalism Architecture
The validity of the interoperation of these two formalisms was established in Abu Jbara and Levis (2013) based on the approach described in Levis et al. (2012) . 
THE DECISION MAKING ORGANIZATION MODEL
The decision making organizations under consideration consist of groups of interacting decision makers processing information received through systems that enable information sharing (e.g., a cloud) and who interact to produce a unique organizational response for each task that is processed. Each interacting organization member is modeled as consisting of a five-stage process as shown in Fig. 2 . The decision maker receives a signal, x, from the external environment or from another decision maker. The Situation Assessment stage (SA) represents the processing of the incoming signal x to obtain the assessed situation, z, which may be shared with other decision makers. The decision maker can also receive situation assessment signals z' from other decision makers within the organization; z' and z are then fused together in the Information Fusion (IF) stage to produce z". The fused information is then processed at the Task Processing (TP) stage to produce v, a signal that contains the task information necessary to select a response. Command information from other decision makers is received as v'. The Command Interpretation (CI) stage then combines v and v' to produce the variable w, which is input to the Response Selection (RS) stage. The RS stage then produces the output y to the environment, or the output y' to other decision makers.
A Petri Net model is used to depict interactions between decision makers; the admissible interactions are limited to the four types shown in Fig. 3 in which only the interactions from the i th (DM i ) to the j th decision maker (DM j ) are shown. Similar interactions exist from the j th to the i th one. Furthermore, not all these interactions can coexist, if deadlocks are to be avoided (Remy and Levis, 1988) . Figure 4 shows an example of a decision making organization consisting of a forward unit and a command unit that can perform three different missions: humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, of a non-combatant evacuation. Both units assess the signals that they receive from the environment in their respective Situation Assessment stages. The forward unit (subordinate) sends the result of its own assessment to the command unit (commander), who fuses in the Information Fusion stage this information with its own assessment. On the basis of the result of this interaction, the command unit identifies the mission or situation and produces an order which is the sent to the subordinate unit. The latter interprets the order in the Command Interpretation stage and executes the mission.
.
Figure 4: A Two Unit Organization
A decision maker may have access to or select different systems and different algorithms that process the input depending on the type of signals received. The DM chooses an algorithm according to his area of expertise and the prevailing circumstances (timeliness, access to systems, etc.). Each algorithm is characterized by the accuracy of its output and the associated delay in producing it. The algorithms may all reside in one system (e.g., at the command unit) or be located in different system nodes; they may be accessible directly through an intranet or they may be accessible through the communication networks. There may be inconsistent or conflicting assessments at the IF stages of the two units for a variety of reasons: using different data sets (e.g., new vs. old data) or different assessment algorithms. A mechanism would be needed to resolve such inconsistencies or conflicts. A similar argument is made about the Response Selection stage where DMs have different algorithms for generating a response. The expanded model of the example (Fig. 5) shows the existence of three SA algorithms and three RS algorithms to reflect the three different missions that the organization has been trained to execute. This is a Colored Petri Net model (Jensen and Kristensen, 2009 ) with deterministic time but stochastic algorithm selection. The application CPN Tools (2014) has been used to implement the model.
The organization in Fig. 5 is a team of two DMs that collaborate with each other to make decisions based on the available inputs.
1. They share the same goal(s), i.e., the set of output responses is shared between all the team members. 2. They share the same skill(s) where the skill set is modeled by the sets of three algorithms in the SA stage and the three in the RS stage. This means that they have the same sets of algorithms but, because they have different areas of expertise, they may use their skill sets in different ways. 3. They should be synchronized to be able to perform tasks effectively. [(sa = 3 andalso n <= dm2_response3_3) (sa = 2 andalso n > dm2_response2_2 an (sa = 1 andalso n > dm2_response1_1 + RS2_2 @ +rs2_delay
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ON MEASURES
In order to assess the effect of cyber exploits, measures are needed. A set of new measures is defined here that is computable from the Colored Petri net model of the decision making organization. These measures were originally defined in Grevet and Levis (1988) .
To characterize the coordination for an interaction such as at the IF or CI stage in the model of Fig. 5 order relations are defined on the set of tokens fired by the corresponding transition:
Ψ 1 is a binary relation defined by:
((x, y, z) Ψ 1 (x', y', z')) ↔ ((x = x') and (y < y'))
Ψ 2 is a binary relation defined by:
((x, y, z) Ψ 2 (x', y', z')) ↔ ((x = x') and (z = z'))
Each token in the Colored Petri Net model is characterized by the triplet (T n , T d , C) where T n is the time at which this input token was generated by the source, T d is the time at which a token entered the current processing stage, and the attribute C characterizes the mission or task.
The firing of IF (or CI) is synchronized if and only if:
where i and k are two decision makers. This definition allows to discriminate between firings that are synchronized and firings in which one or several tokens arrive in their respective corresponding places with some delay.
The firing of IF (or CI) is consistent if and only if:
i.e., the data fused by a decision maker are consistent if they correspond to the same task or mission C.
On this basis, the following definition for the coordination of an interaction is obtained: The firing of a transition (such as IF) is coordinated if, and only if, it is synchronized and consistent.
The definition of coordination applies to a single interaction. The definitions of the coordination of a single task, i.e., for a sequence of interactions concerning the same input, as well as for all tasks executed in a mission are as follows: The execution of a task is coordinated if, and only if, it is coordinated for all interactions that occur during the task. The execution of a mission is coordinated if, and only if, it is coordinated for all its tasks.
Consider a transition such as IF (or CI) with multiple input places. The V(x i , IF) denotes the vector that describes the colors of the tokens in the preset that have been generated as a result of the signal x i (task or mission) produced by the external source. Then the degree of information consistency (DIC) for stage IF and input task x i is defined as:
, )) ( ( , ) ( ( , ) where prob(V(x i , IF)) is the probability of having tokens with attributes generated by xi in the input places of IF. Then let z be the number of subsets of two elements of V(x i , IF):
and let n be the number of subsets of V(x i , IF) such that the two elements are equal.
By adding the degrees of information consistency for IF and CI and each task x i and weighing by the probability of having that input task, the organizational degree of information consistency, DIC, for the tasks at hand can be evaluated:
This measure varies between 0 and 1, with 1 being the ideal information consistency of all interactions across all tasks.
The total processing time for a task by a decision maker consists of two parts: (a) the total time during which the decision maker actually carries out the task; and (b) the total time spent by the information prior to being processed. The latter time is due to two factors: (i) Information can remain unprocessed until the decision maker decides to process it with a relevant algorithm. Since an algorithm cannot process two inputs at the same time, some inputs will have to remain in queue for a certain amount of time until the relevant algorithm is available. (ii) Information can also remain unprocessed because the decision maker has to wait to receive data from another organization member. Consequently, an organization is not well synchronized when decision makers have to wait before receiving the information that they need in order to continue their task processing. Conversely, the organization is well synchronized when these lags are small.
The degree of synchronization for the organization, DOS, is given by:
where S(x i , B) is the total delay in transition B because of differences in the arrival time of the enabling tokens in its preset.
Two more measures were defined for evaluating the effect of cyber exploits on organizational performance.
Accuracy of the Organization J(δ) is the degree to which the organization produces desirable results (with lowest penalty) when using strategy δ. This is a global measure which ideally would be one but in realistic situations it is always less than one.
Where {x i } is the set of tasks and {y h } is the set of admissible responses from which the response y h is selected for task x i and y di is the ideal response for input x i . Cost(y h ,y di ) represents the cost associated with the organization's response.
Timeliness of the Organization T(δ) is the total response time of the organization from the time a task arrives to the time a response is produced, i.e., the task has been executed using strategy δ.
T ( ) = ( )
Up to this point, the model of an organization executing a set of tasks that arrive according to some probability distribution has been described. Also, measures of performance of the organization have been defined.
When fusion of data is performed by a decision maker it is possible that the available markings may allow multiple enablement of the IF (or CI) transition. Consequently, enablement rules need to be introduced at this point. Two alternative rules have been considered: Rule 2: The transition IF (or CI) is enabled if Rule 1 applies or if delays in receiving inputs from other organization members exceed a pre-specified limit.
THE NETWORK MODEL
In the example of Fig. 5 , interactions between the forward unit and the command unit occur through computer communications networks. The network model shown in Fig. 6 used in this example is a free-style wired, packet switching network with TCP/ IP as its protocol suite. This connection-oriented protocol was employed in order to handle reliability, message ordering and streaming at the Transport Layer rather than the Application Layer. The Application Layer will extract the transmitted data and deliver it to the organizational model through the C2 Wind Tunnel (Hemingway et al., 2011) at the designated terminal. The C2 Wind Tunnel (Fig. 1) is a test bed that enables the interoperation of models by providing the necessary infrastructure as well as the tools for scheduling the interactions among interoperating models. The data received at the terminal is then examined for timeliness and integrity back in the CPN organizational model. The network model was implemented using OMNeT++ (2014) which is an extensible, modular, componentbased C++ simulation library and framework, primarily for building network simulators. This is a discrete event simulation environment consisting of simple/compound modules with each module having a defined functionality (according to the relative C++ class). Each module could be triggered with an appropriate event defined in its class. For the model of Fig. 6 the INET (2014) framework was used which supports different networking protocols including the four layers of the TCP/ IP protocol. The framework provides simple/ compound modules for all the four layers of the TCP/ IP. The nodes in Fig. 6 contain in them the internal network structure for the corresponding entity (command unit, forward unit, and Higher HQ).
MODELING CYBER EXPLOITS
Two types of cyber exploits were implemented for the computational experiments: 1) Denial of Service attack and 2) Integrity attack. The Denial of Service is an attempt to make a network resource unavailable or render it too slow to be useful. This attack affects a localized region of the network topology, e.g., some routers. The Integrity attack, as was defined in this case, involves tampering with the contents of the data packets in order to compromise the performance of the organization through deception. It is usually the case that the attacker intercepts the data being passed between two terminals for a considerable amount of time; this sometimes leads to the detection of an anomaly
The two types of attack were implemented in OMNeT++ for a predefined scenario that can generate coordinated attacks of both types. The Denial of Service exploits were modeled as a delay in a communication path or as a total failure of a network resource (e.g., a router) for a finite amount of time as defined in the scenario. The integrity attacks were implemented as an alteration in the message contents, i.e., by changing the attribute values of the tokens, at specified times as defined in the scenario. The results of the attack were evaluated using the measures of performance defined in the measures section.
COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS
The organization model (Fig. 5) implemented in CPN Tools, and the communication network model (Fig. 6 ) implemented in OMNet++ inter-operated through the infrastructure provided by the C2 Wind Tunnel (Fig. 1) . The scenario generated tasks {x i } to be performed by the organization. As described earlier, three different types of events were considered: Humanitarian Assistance (Event 1), Disaster Relief (Event 2) and Non-combatant evaluation operations (NEO) (Event 3). The area of expertise of each organization member was modeled as the probability of choosing the right algorithm in the Situation Assessment stage that matched the event, and the probability of choosing the right algorithm in the Response Selection stage for the corresponding assessed situation. The values for the Forward Unit are shown in Tables 1 and 2 and for the Command Unit in Tables 3 and 4 . For example, the Forward Unit has a 90% probability of assessing correctly a Humanitarian Assistance task but only 80% a Disaster Relief one. The cost function included in the definition of the Accuracy measure is shown in Table 5 . Selecting the correct response has a cost of 1 while selecting the other two responses has a cost of 100. Tables 6 to 9. Table 6 establishes the baseline for this scenario for the four measures, Accuracy, Timeliness, Degree of Information Consistency (DIC), and Degree of Synchronization (DOS). In this case, there are no delays beyond the minimum processing delays and there are no errors in selecting the appropriate algorithm. The batch mode results show the degradation in performance when there is 20% probability that an attack will take place. Tables 8 and 9 show clearly that integrity attacks at the Information Fusion stage have significant impact on the timely response of the organization and, as a result, the synchronization degrades significantly. An attack on the Command Interpretation stage has a considerable impact on the organization's accuracy in the response to the task. The results lead to the observation that the way inconsistencies due to the cyber exploits are handled would make an appreciable difference in performance especially at the Command Interpretation stage. Thus, further research is needed to identify mechanisms that improve the resilience of a decision making organization to cyber exploits.
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CONCLUSIONS
A new approach based on multi-formalism modeling to model, analyze, and evaluate the effect of cyber exploits on the coordination in organizations has been presented. The focus is on the effect that cyber exploits have on the performance of a decision making organization when its ability to share uncorrupted information in a timely manner is degraded due to cyber exploits on the networks that support the interactions between organization members. Two new measures of performance, information consistency and synchronization, were used to demonstrate the effect of cyber exploits, as well as the traditional accuracy and timeliness The approach in now being applied to much larger examples in which different information sources, local and network-wide cyber exploits, and complex protocols can be tested.
